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The ‘efficiency paradox’ has generated controversy and suggests that mainstream economics is not neutral in the way it
deals with climate change. An alternative economic framework, evolutionary economics, is used to investigate this crucial
issue and offer insights into the development of a complementary framework for designing climate policy and for
managing the transition to a low-carbon society. The evolutionary framework allows us to identify the presence of two
sources of inertia (i.e. at the individual level through ‘habits’ and at the level of socio-technical systems) that mutually
reinforce each other in a path-dependent manner. To overcome ‘carbon lock-in’, decision-makers should design
measures (e.g. commitment strategies, niche management) that specifically target those change-resisting factors, as
they tend to reduce the efficiency of traditional instruments. A series of recommendations for policy-makers is provided.
Keywords: climate change; energy consumption; evolutionary economics; habits; technological lock-in; transitions
Le « paradoxe d’efficience » en énergie, qui a suscité de nombreux débats, suggère que la science économique
dominante n’est pas neutre dans sa manière d’aborder le problème des changements climatiques. Cette question
essentielle est ici étudiée à l’aide d’un autre cadre d’analyse, celui de l’économie évolutionniste. L’objectif est de fournir
des éléments visant à développer une approche complémentaire pour l’élaboration des politiques climatiques et la gestion
de la transition vers une société sobre en carbone. L’approche évolutionniste nous permet de décrire la présence de deux
sources d’inertie (c’est-à-dire au niveau individuel, celui des « habitudes », et au niveau des systèmes sociotechniques)
qui se renforcent mutuellement tout en étant fortement dépendantes de la trajectoire initialement suivie. Pour surmonter le
«verrouillage carbone», les décideurs devraient donc concevoir des mesures (ex : stratégies d’engagement, gestion de
niche) ciblant spécifiquement ces facteurs de résistance au changement étant donné leur impact négatif sur l’efficacité
des instruments traditionnels. A cet égard, plusieurs recommandations sont proposées à destination des décideurs.
Mots clés: changement climatique; consommation d’énergie; économie évolutionniste; habitudes; transitions; verrouillage
technologique
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1. Introduction
From the very beginning of international talks on climate change, up until the most recent
discussions on a post-Kyoto international framework, economic arguments have turned out to be
crucial elements of the analysis that shapes policy responses to the climate threat (Maréchal,
2007). This can be illustrated by the prominent role that economics has played in the different
analyses produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the impact
of climate change on society (Toman, 2006).
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As mentioned by Gowdy (2004), the mainstream paradigm is the dominant standard among
economists and their audience.1 It thus provides the theoretical background on which policy-
making is based. Climate policy is no exception, as the mainstream view in economics has been a
key factor in designing climate policies (Toman, 2006). This is illustrated by the fact that strict
Walrasian computable general equilibrium (CGE) models – the primary tool of mainstream
economics – have clearly dominated most of climate-related economic analysis (Laitner et al.,
2000; Löschel, 2002).2 However, the use of such models is being questioned. As mentioned by
Nannen and van den Bergh (2008, p. 1), ‘[a]lthough these models have generated many clear
insights, they do not represent the full range of model approaches and questions that can be
addressed’. For instance, the fact that the mainstream approach is qualified as being ahistorical
(Foster, 1997, p. 432) means that crucial elements such as the path-dependence of technological
change cannot be grasped.
Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to investigate how the analytical framework of
evolutionary economics could provide an insightful complement for dealing with the climate
issue. The choice of an evolutionary line of thought is quite straightforward: given its focus on
innovation and system change, it provides a useful approach to start with for assessing and
managing the necessary transition towards a low-carbon economy.
This article brings together and develops further the insights relating to the notion of ‘lock-in’
that arise from the evolutionary perspective. These insights have been exposed separately in two
earlier works that were focused on energy issues (Maréchal, 2007, 2009). Building on the view that
individuals and institutions mutually constitute each other, the aim of this article is to provide a
framework that allows for both the socio-technical and the behavioural sides of the lock-in process
to be depicted and accounted for in the analysis. Beyond relating this analytical perspective to
ongoing theoretical and policy debates on climate change, this article also provides novel insights
in terms of policy recommendations that target both sources of inertia and also their interplay in
order to find ways to overcome what has been termed the ‘carbon lock-in’ (Unruh, 2000).
The article is structured as follows. In the following section, we first present a brief overview of
the main assumptions endorsed in traditional economic analyses of environmental issues. The
rest of Section 2 is devoted to the implications of relying on the framework of mainstream
economics for dealing with climate change, by looking more closely at the debate on the ‘efficiency
paradox’. Section 3 discusses the complementary insights that arise from adopting an evolutionary
approach, highlighting the path-dependence and lock-in of both consumption behaviours and
technological change. In Section 4, we deal with the implications of our approach for policy-
making in the field of energy and climate change. Section 5 then concludes.
2. Climate policy analyses and their limits
2.1. Core economic assumptions and the climate change context
The way in which economists usually frame the decision-making process is to assume that agents
are perfectly rational (or behave as if they were so). It thus follows that the policy recommendations
of most economists are ‘conforming to the axioms of consumer choice embodied in Homo
economicus’ (Gowdy, 2007, p. 650). Echoing the work of Herbert Simon on ‘bounded rationality’,3
this is sometimes viewed as ‘the ‘unbounded rationality’ assumption of mainstream economics’
(Venkatchalam, 2008, p. 640). Beyond the obvious limited availability of information (and of the
time to process it), what is crucially missing in the rational actor framework with respect to
knowledge is its potential ambiguity as well as differences in interpretation and its inherently
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tacit nature. All these aspects are essential for understanding the determinants of consumer
behaviour and, most specifically, the role played by habits. As shown in Section 3, this dimension
is of importance for energy- and climate-related analyses.
Although the underlying assumptions of the rational model have been called into question for
quite a long time (Allais, 1953; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), it is only with recent developments
in cognitive science and related work in behavioural economics and neuroeconomics (see, for
instance, Camerer et al., 2005), that these criticisms have begun to have an impact. This is largely
due to the experimental nature of these recent developments, which made them replicable and
thus amenable to testing (Gintis, 2007). What is also important in this respect is that the abundant
empirical evidence gathered leads to the identification of some regularities of behaviour that
allow for an alternative model to be envisaged (Gowdy, 2008). These regularities change the way
usual notions – such as self-interest and preferences – are to be understood, since they now have
to account for crucial elements such as strong reciprocity, loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting,
habituation, etc. (Gowdy, 2007, 2008).
Nevertheless, the traditional paradigm remains the dominant standard among economists.
Policy advice is thus ‘based on these outdated representations of human behaviour and commodity
production’ (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005, p. 208). This is also the case of all the different streams
of normative environmental economics such as the Pigouvian approach of negative externality,
the Coasian property rights approach, or the commonly used cost–benefit analysis (Venkatchalam,
2008, p. 640). But, as recently acknowledged by Dasgupta (2008, p. 46) ‘property rights to natural
capital are often either vaguely defined or weakly enforced, meaning that nature’s services are
underpriced in the market’.
Economists working on climate change should thus broaden what they consider to be the task
at hand. This means going beyond the idea of simply assigning property rights and adjusting
relative prices in order to avoid negative externalities induced by economic growth. Although it
may be deemed to be a departure from the traditional treatment of climate change by economists
(Barker, 2008, p. 175), the Stern Review (Stern, 2006) is still based on rational choice theory (i.e.
under the form of the related ‘expected utility theory’).4 It has also been designed in this spirit of
making predictions about the negative impacts of economic growth and measuring them. However,
beyond the debate around the Stern Review, a growing part of the scientific community is now
becoming more inclined to frame the problem differently (Dasgupta, 2007).
Indeed, the way of framing climate change using only quantitative and formal economic
analysis led economists to press for what Dasgupta (2007, p. 23) qualifies as a ‘misplaced
concreteness’.5 This is largely due to the particular characteristics of the climate threat, which
cannot easily be dealt with using the usual economic tools. For instance, since the view that
‘economic processes tend towards timeless equilibrium states remains the foundation upon which
mainstream economic analysis is built’ (Foster, 1997, p. 429), this leaves room for analyses to be
performed considering economic evolution as a reversible process. This is obviously in contradiction
to the potential irreversibility of some predicted impacts of climate change. The issue at stake is
thus one of adequately dealing with events characterized by low probability of occurrence and
high potential impact. This problem that arises from ‘the incredible magnitude of the deep
structural uncertainties that are involved in climate-change analysis’ is acknowledged in Weitzman
(2009, p. 35), where it is claimed to make conventional cost–benefit analyses ‘especially and
unusually misleading’.
The ‘efficiency paradox’ provides an insightful illustration of the need for economists to widen
their usual approach which, as will be shown, can also be considered to have been partly misleading.
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2.2. The ‘efficiency paradox’
A great deal of research reported in the climate-related literature has been devoted to analysing
what has been termed the ‘no-regret’ emission reduction potential, which triggered an extensive
debate among economists.6 An emission reduction potential is said to be ‘no-regret’ when the
costs of implementing a measure are more than offset by the benefits it generates, such as reduced
energy bills (Maréchal, 2007). Still, even though they are highly profitable, most energy-efficient
investments are not implemented spontaneously by economic agents, which leads to what has
been termed the ‘efficiency gap’ (see Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Krause, 1996) or the ‘efficiency
paradox’ (DeCanio, 1998).
As shown in more detail by Maréchal (2009), the use of the mainstream framework of analysis
has clearly been misleading with respect to this important debate.7 To begin with, it is important
to recall that the ‘efficiency paradox’ was first highlighted by bottom-up engineering approaches
(i.e. those that do not rely on the standard framework of Homo economicus). As mentioned by
DeCanio (1998), it is the incompatibility of this ‘efficiency paradox’ with mainstream theory
that explains the initial scepticism of economists regarding the existence of such untapped
profitable opportunities. Indeed, according to the mainstream paradigm, if such a profitable
potential did exist, ‘unboundedly rational’ economic agents would eventually undertake the
necessary investments to capture it (Sutherland, 2000).
After having argued against the existence of a ‘no-regret’ potential at the beginning, mainstream
economists, faced with overwhelming evidence on the ‘efficiency gap’, resorted to the traditional
view of ‘market failures’ that lead to erroneous market signals to rescue the Homo economicus
paradigm.8 Based on this kind of framework, the goal is then to provide economic agents with
the correct information to persuade them to invest in energy-efficient measures.
Again, empirical studies have shown that the picture is not as simple. First, bottom-up studies
have shown that transaction costs, although they exist, do not quite offset the benefits from
identified profitable energy-efficient investments (see Brown, 2001, for a survey of such studies).
Second, and more fundamentally, empirical studies have shown that there were other obstacles
to profitable energy-efficient investments that are of a different nature than economic market
failures.9 Non-economic obstacles – which have mostly been neglected by energy economists – are
thus an important part of the explanation that requires to be appropriately understood. They are
often referred to as ‘barriers’ and partly relate to the aforementioned ‘bounded rationality’ of
economic agents.10 As shown in the following section, the stance of this article is that the framework
of evolutionary economics is very useful in that it is able to provide a two-fold account (i.e.
relying on both individual and socio-technical sources of inertia) of this limited rationality of
individuals – which refers to their incapacity of acting purely as optimizing agents.
3. An evolutionary approach to climate policy: path-dependence
More than a century ago, Thorstein Veblen was already wondering ‘why economics is not an
evolutionary science’ (Veblen, 1898). His work is still very insightful for those currently involved
in climate policy, as he can be viewed as the precursor of the notions both of path-dependence
and of habits. In turn, those two notions provide a response to the drawbacks raised in Section 2.
On the one hand, the evolutionary approach of habits can serve to explain the efficiency paradox.
On the other hand, the notion of path-dependence provides an interesting starting point on
which to build alternative policies and measures aimed at inducing the needed technological
changes towards a low-carbon economy.
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3.1. The evolutionary framework and environmental issues
Veblen’s legacy is significant when it comes to thinking about institutions, evolution and change.
Not only has Veblen depicted the institutional foundation on which capitalism is built but he also
suggested a way for better grasping the interactions between individuals and social forces – especially
with the notion of habits for both firms and consumers. It is to be noted that Veblen’s main concerns
were not about environmental issues as such, but rather about the concept of evolution and the way
in which economists misused analogy for observing economic change. It was not until several decades
later, with the pioneer work of Boulding (1981) and Georgescu-Roegen (1971), that a formal connection
between the environmental and evolutionary agendas was eventually made (for a survey, see van den
Bergh, 2007; Witt 2008). However, despite their great insights, these works remained largely ignored
within the field of evolutionary economics until recently (Dosi and Grazzi, 2006; Witt, 2008).
The most accomplished work within the field of evolutionary economics is undoubtedly the
seminal book of Nelson and Winter (1982), which explicitly presents a theoretical framework for
thinking about evolution and change (Arena and Lazaric, 2003). Their source of inspiration
comes from Joseph Schumpeter and Herbert Simon, from whom they inherited this dynamic and
innovative way of thinking about changes. Their main achievement is to provide a more realistic
vision of the firm. Relying strongly on the aforementioned idea of bounded rationality, the firm
is no longer seen as being driven only by the primary goal of profit maximization but also by its
survival given the environment in which it operates.
In such a framework, innovation matters for a firm’s growth and development, but ‘satisfying’
(i.e. not necessarily optimizing) strategies such as organizational routines also play a significant
role (Becker et al., 2005). Routines are not only the knowledge base of the firm but also its
organizational memory, that is to say the locus where knowledge is selected, stored and activated
(Lazaric and Denis, 2005). Skills used by employees, organizational routines and innovations are
the necessary triptych for ensuring a firm’s viability in a long-term perspective. It follows that
what is important here is not so much to have ‘good’ innovations but to rely on satisfactory
routines for fully benefiting from innovative activity. Organizational inertia then becomes a
major concern, since it is seen as a way of protecting firms from turbulence. Learning and adaptation
are certainly the most satisfactory strategies for running a business in contexts fraught with
uncertainty and unpredictability (Nelson, 2008). Putting the emphasis on bounded rationality is
not only valid for groups such as organizations or firms, but also for individuals. Whereas firms
have organizational routines, the satisfactory strategies of individuals are commonly called habits.11
Recently, some evolutionary models have started to deal more explicitly with environmental
issues through a reconciliation of Veblen’s insights with the framework developed by Nelson and
Winter (for a survey of such models, see Faber and Frenken, 2008). The added value of the
evolutionary framework in economics with respect to environmental policy is that it highlights
the role played by inertia and path-dependence at the level of firms, consumers and technologies.12
Taken together, this tends to favour the ‘lock-in’ of socio-technical systems, as shown in the rest
of this section. As paradoxical as it may seem, it is essential to have a good understanding of the
underlying causes of inertia prior to deciding how to enforce a change. Given that routines and
habits ‘are performed by people who think and feel and care’, they also offer ‘a tremendous
potential for change’ (Feldman, 2000, p. 614).
3.2. Path-dependence of economic change: the problem of technological lock-in
Given the need to shift to a low-carbon economy, as well as the unsatisfactory treatment of
technological change in mainstream modelling (Maréchal, 2007; Nannen and van den Bergh, 2008),
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turning to the framework of evolutionary economics appears promising, considering its core
characteristics.
Building on earlier work (Maréchal, 2007), defining what can be considered an evolutionary
view of technological change (TC) may be done by starting from two elements. The first is the
lack of formal historical connection which is identified as a major drawback of many analyses
(Foster, 1997, p. 433). This inevitably leads towards what could be called the ‘David and Arthur
theory’ of path-dependence and lock-in, which stresses the historically contingent nature of
economic change (see David, 1985; Arthur, 1989).
The second element is that the added value of an evolutionary approach of TC, even compared
with the most recent analyses based on endogenous modelling of TC, is that TC is ‘contextualized’
(Mulder et al., 1999). To be more precise, this means that the circumstances of its emergence are
explained – which is highlighted through a systemic vision of technologies as ‘interrelated’ (see
Veblen, 1915, p. 130).
It is important to note that modelling has gone through major improvements recently, especially
in the field of climate policy, where models with endogenous technical change (ETC) have been
developed (see Edenhofer et al., 2006). However, even though these models incorporate a form of
learning processes with increasing returns, they still fail to integrate the main features of the
evolutionary-inspired approach of TC, namely systemic interdependencies, heterogeneity of agents,
and historical contingencies (Maréchal, 2007, p. 5186).
To briefly illustrate what results from taking into account both the contextualization and the
historical contingencies, it is again enlightening to turn to Thorstein Veblen. Using the example
of British small wagons, Veblen (1915) shows that systemic interdependencies imply that
technologies can no longer be seen as isolated but rather as belonging to technological systems.
Those systems can be defined as ‘interrelated components connected in a network or infrastructure
that includes physical, social and informational elements’ (Unruh, 2000, p. 819). Adding the fact
that technologies are also dependent upon and connected with the wider range of cultural,
organizational and institutional aspects of their environment that enable them to work together,
we end up with what Geels and Kemp (2007) call socio-technical systems (STS)13 or what Unruh
(2000) calls techno-institutional complexes (TIC).
This intertwining of different elements that characterizes a STS sheds light on the potential inertia
of such systems. Indeed, once historical conditions have led to the emergence of a STS, their multiple
components contribute to stabilize the system in a self-reinforcing manner. The nature and type of a
STS is thus dependent upon the path followed14 and is further perpetuated through the interactions
of its multiple elements. Positive feedbacks (i.e. increasing returns to adoption) act as a sort of snowball
which results in the locking-in of the incumbent STS following a path-dependent process.
3.3. ‘Path-dependence’ of consumption behaviours: the role of habits
Even though the idea of ‘habituation’ was explicitly mentioned in the pioneer work of Paul
David, the ‘behavioural’ part has been somewhat overlooked in the literature that followed on
the lock-in process (Barnes et al., 2004, p. 372). However, through focusing almost exclusively on
the ‘technological’ side, an important part of the explanation for the locking-in of the carbon-
based STS is missing. As described below, the role of habits (i.e. behavioural predispositions to
repeat a well-practised action that is triggered by a contextual cue)15 is essential for explaining the
‘efficiency paradox’.
‘Most of the time what we do is what we do most of the time’ (Townsend and Bever, 2001, p. 2).
This often-quoted sentence is meant to emphasize that much of our behaviour in daily life is
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characterized by repetition. From the empirical work of Wendy Wood and colleagues (Wood et
al., 2002; Quinn and Wood, 2005), we know that many activities are not only repetitive in frequency
but they also are performed in stable contexts. Such consistency sets a favourable breeding ground
for habits (i.e. the behavioural predisposition to repeat a well-practised action given a context) to
develop (Ouellette and Wood, 1998). Once formed in those circumstances of both high frequency
and stability, habits then become a strong predictor of behaviour ‘over and above intentions,
suggesting that such behaviour is initiated without much deliberation and thought’ (Danner
et al., 2008, p. 246). The obvious advantage of adopting this kind of ‘habit’ in decision-making is
that it frees up resources than can be devoted to solving non-routine problems.
The concept of habits is essential in analysing the determinants of domestic energy consumption,
as it sheds an insightful light on the puzzling question of why it keeps rising even though there
is an evident increase in awareness and concern about energy-related environmental issues such
as climate change. Indeed, if we subscribe to the idea that energy-consuming behaviours are often
guided by habits, and that deeply ingrained habits can become counter-intentional (Verplanken
and Faes, 1999), it then follows that people may often display ‘locked-in’ practices in their daily
energy consumption behaviour.
The next step is thus to assess the role of habits in influencing energy consumption behaviours.
To start with, it seems obvious that behaviours such as switching off the lights or turning off
appliances (i.e. ‘curtailment behaviours’ in the sense of Gardner and Stern, 2002) meet the three
conditions identified by Jackson (2005, p. 64) for the balance of the decision-making process to
swing away from cognitive effort and towards automaticity: low degree of involvement, low
perceived complexity, and high degree of constraint.16 One other important element that
characterizes domestic energy consumption is that it is not visible (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Jackson,
2005). This implies that people do not consider the remote environmental impacts of their actions
when performing energy-related behaviours. This obviously facilitates the retention of
unsustainable habits in this area (Martiskaïnen, 2008, p. 77).
All together, this suggests that everyday energy-related behaviours do not require much intentional
effort to be set in motion, such as it has been shown to be the case of, for example, food consumption
in adolescents (Kremers et al., 2007). This is in line with a recent empirical analysis, where energy
use – along with nutrition and mobility – are seen as ‘forms of behaviour that are hardly reflected
upon in everyday life’ (Schäfer and Bamberg, 2008, p. 213). This is also corroborated by a review of
studies on domestic energy consumption where one of the lessons learnt is that the importance of
habits can ‘prevent that (pro-environmental) behaviour from happening’ and make a person ‘act
opposite to his or her intentions without even realising it’ (Martiskaïnen, 2008, p. 87).
3.4. Contribution of the evolutionary view
As mentioned in a previous paper (Maréchal, 2007), this evolutionary perspective of economics is
of great importance for energy- and climate-related issues in at least three different ways. First, it
has been shown by Grubler (1998) that the past two centuries could be viewed as the succession of
essentially three socio-technical systems (STS), all based on a source of energy. In line with this
approach, some analysts argue that we are currently locked into a carbon-based STS as our economies
strongly rely on the use of exhaustible fossil fuels (Unruh, 2000; Arentsen et al., 2002).
Second, since the emergence of a given STS is historically contingent, and thus not only governed
by optimality, it may be that it is based on an inferior design of technology (David, 1985).
Third, as Shove (2004) observed: technologies are embedded in a strongly influential social
context of institutions which shapes consumption while also being shaped by technological
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constraints. Given that a ‘structure is always both enabling and constraining’ (Giddens, 1984,
p. 169), choices in energy consumption are strongly influenced by the existing carbon-based STS
through wider forces such as norms, media, technical designs, etc. (Shove et al., 2008; Strengers,
2008). To be functional, people’s habits have to be ‘accordant’ with prevailing socio-technical
forces which shape consumers’ choices towards more energy-consuming ways of life. This can be
illustrated by the increase in average internal temperatures in UK houses from 13.8°C in 1970 to
18.2°C in 2004,17 while the average number of electric appliances increased from 17 to 47 over the
same time period (Healy, 2008; Martiskaïnen, 2008). In addition, while choices in energy
consumption are being strongly influenced by the existing STS, they, in turn, contribute to
reinforcing and maintaining the incumbent STS.
The evolutionary framework adopted in this article is thus crucial because it builds on the idea
that individuals and institutions ‘mutually constitute and condition each other’ (Hodgson, 1997,
404).18 This mutual constitutiveness renders habits an additional factor of technological stability.
In turn, this provides a two-fold complementary explanation for the existence of the ‘efficiency
paradox’ beyond the common economic ones.
4. Implications for policy-making
Even though the added value of complementing economic analyses of climate change with an
evolutionary perspective has been clearly shown in the previous sections, Nelson and Winter
(1982) remind us that the ‘ability of a theory to illuminate policy issues ought to be a principal
criterion by which to judge its merit’. This is why, in this section, we provide some insights into
the implications for policy-making that arise from adopting an evolutionary approach.
We can summarize the contributions of evolutionary economics to the issue of climate change
by pointing to both its departure from the perfect rationality hypothesis and its shift of focus
towards a better understanding of economic dynamics. Such a framework allows us to depict the
presence of two sources of inertia (i.e. at the level of individuals and at the level of socio-technical
systems) that mutually reinforce each other. This is in line with a recent empirical analysis in the
field of energy consumption in Denmark which shows that there are both ‘similarity and
collectivity’ as well as ‘variety and individuality’ in behaviours (Gram-Hanssen, 2008, p. 14).
Given this context, policies aiming at reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions would
thus have to deal with both sources of resistance to change. This means not only shifting the
incumbent carbon-based STS so that starts to shape decisions towards the desired direction (i.e. a
low-carbon economy) but also deconstructing the habits that this same STS has forged with time.
Recommendation 1: The maintenance of solution diversity is important for allowing
climate-friendly technologies to emerge
Unlocking from a desirable trajectory that is no longer desirable is not a task that can easily be
undertaken, since it is difficult to identify the solution that would yield the best outcome. Collective
learning in the field of policy-making is largely indeterminate and policy-makers may be tempted
to skip the learning phase if this leads to policies that meet their aspiration ‘even if the policy
would be inferior from the point of view of an omniscient observer’ (Schnellenbach, 2005, p. 115).
Wisdom would thus require governments to delay their commitment to an inextricable future
and leave a diverse range of technological options open (Berkhout, 2002, p. 3).19
If their ability to foresee the future is obviously limited, policy-makers should then learn about
the evolutionary processes at play. In their thorough review of Dutch environmental policy,
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van den Bergh et al. (2007) provided a good illustration of the inherent difficulty of applying
evolutionary principles. For instance, ‘diversity is acknowledged in policy documents, but in
practice this applies mainly to diversity in technologies and much less to diversity in companies,
products and strategies’ (van den Bergh et al., 2007, p. 87). In fact, most of the evolutionary
insights that appear to be conflicting with the general focus on efficiency are often neglected by
policy-makers.
What is needed in the case of climate policy is a technological succession (Windrum and
Birchenhall, 2005), which is considered as a necessary condition for attaining a low-carbon society
(Koehler et al., 2006, p. 18). In other words, there needs to be a transition from the incumbent
socio-technical system to a more climate-friendly configuration. Bearing in mind the
aforementioned interrelations between demand, technology and society, ‘long-term technology
policy should take account of the socio-cultural contexts in which technologies fit’ as claimed by
Wilhite (2007, p. 29). Policy-makers should thus learn about those interactions and promote the
type of measures that have been proven successful in overcoming lock-in situations (Mulder
et al., 1999; Windrum, 1999).
One inevitable consequence of looking at technical change through an evolutionary framework
is that transitions will typically involve a multi-level dynamic of complex interactions and
feedbacks in a path-dependent manner. This clearly means that the outcome will be of an emergent
(i.e. rather than planned and structured), uncertain and complex nature (Raven, 2007).
Accordingly, policy-makers should refrain from ‘picking winners’ and instead create conditions
under which the evolutionary process of economic change would lead to the desired outcome
(i.e. climate protection in this case).
There are two broad strategies that are commonly identified in the literature as being capable
of triggering transitions: niche20 accumulation and hybridization (Raven, 2007, p. 2392), with
the former starting from a radically distinct field, while the latter builds on the existing regime.21
Accordingly, both strategies display advantages and drawbacks that are related to their respective
closeness to the incumbent regime. This may explain why, in practice, it seems that successful
transitions often involve a mix of both strategies, as illustrated with the example of the gas-
turbine which shows that both strategies were required to overcome the lock-in of the incumbent
steam power plant (Islas, 1997). This view is confirmed in an analysis of distributed generation of
electricity, where it is noted that ‘some elements of the old regime were vigorously rejected, while
others were carried along into the new regime’ (van der Vleuten and Raven, 2006, p. 3747).
Recommendation 2: Motivate consumers with other measures than the usual incentives
to shift from the existing carbon-based socio-technological system
In line with the aforementioned insight of the evolutionary perspective that highlights the
presence of habits in energy consumption, a necessary change would be for decision-makers in
the energy and climate field to stop focusing only on technology and innovation and take into
account the interrelations with the demand-side and society. The incremental improvements
brought to a nascent technological option do not only come from ‘producers of new knowledge
but also from users’ (Schot and Geels, 2007, p. 607).
Acknowledging the role of habits, an innovative policy instrument is the Brussels Energy
Challenge, which sees citizens committing themselves to implementing at least one of the fifteen
energy-saving actions proposed by the regional authorities. As developed in more detail by Maréchal
(2009), there are various strategies that can contribute to changing unsustainable habits in the
field of energy consumption. Among those different options, making the alternative behaviour
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more rewarding seems to provide an interesting point on which to base sustainable energy measures.
This is confirmed by the answers provided by respondents who took part in the Brussels Energy
Challenge, as it is the very notion of ‘challenge’ that is considered to be the most ‘interesting’
aspect of the proposed policy.22 In fact, as mentioned by Matthies et al. (2006, p. 94), commitment
strategies (i.e. as with the Brussels Energy Challenge) enhance ‘self-satisfaction as a result of acting
in accordance with personal values’, and therefore increases ‘the cost of not acting’.
The rational choice model has paved the way for the current state of policy-making where
decision-makers ‘obsessively invoke ‘incentives’ as the panacea for any given social problem’ (Hayes,
2007). But the aforementioned locked-in practices in energy consumption in the form of individual
habits or organizational routines tend to reduce the effectiveness of such ‘antecedent measures’
(Abrahamse et al., 2005; Verplanken and Wood, 2006; Martiskaïnen, 2007). When habits are deeply
ingrained, they often hinder individuals’ attempts to perform a new behaviour even when they
formulate a firm intention to do so. This can also be the case for collective routines (Cohen, 2006,
p. 388). In addition, routines have a narrative role which is especially pronounced with those
routines people pretend to follow. This essential element is referred to as the ‘ostensive’ dimension
of routines and has been discussed by Feldman (2000). Policy-makers should bear in mind the
potential discrepancy which may exist between those ‘ostensive routines’ and ‘performative routines’
(i.e. routines in operation and actually used). This rather frequent gap between intention and
action should not be ignored when policy-makers try to promote new types of behaviour.23
Such psychologically rooted non-economic barriers are thus an important part of the
explanation. They would require a wider range of policies to be implemented if decision-makers
wish to reverse the trend of consumers not always adopting profitable energy-saving regardless of
their strong intention to do so. In short, even though economic incentives may have some
influence, they are far from being the unique relevant factor. Strategies that interfere with the
‘intrinsic motivation’ of individuals may sometimes be rejected by the population, which makes
it necessary to turn to alternative ways (Gagné and Deci, 2005). As has been shown by Frey (1999)
about environmental goals, ‘intrinsic motivation’ cannot be easily regulated. In some cases,
extrinsic motivation (e.g. produced by incentives) may undermine the existing motivation and
create a ‘crowding-out effect’, as illustrated by the famous example of blood donors in Switzerland24
(see also Gowdy, 2008, on this point).
This does not mean that policy-makers should totally give up the usual tools, such as economic
incentives, but they have to learn in which contexts they may turn out to be counter-productive
by reducing existing motivation. Furthermore, the aforementioned role played by habits and
routines may also need to complement traditional measures in order to enhance their effectiveness.
In accordance with empirical studies highlighting the importance of context stability for habit
formation (Wood et al., 2005; Danner et al., 2008), McMakin et al. (2002, p. 851) claim that
‘intervention efforts should explicitly include the characteristics of the targeted living situation
and its residents’. This is the essence of the ‘downstream-plus-context-change interventions’
proposed by Verplanken and Wood (2006, p. 96). The increased effectiveness of linking traditional
measures to sensitive life events or changes of context has been validated empirically in several
studies (Satoshi and Gärling, 2003; Bamberg, 2006, 2007; Verplanken et al., 2008).
More generally, there is no ‘one size fits all’ measure, and effective interventions should thus be
tailored to the characteristics of the targeted group (e.g. norms and motives, consumption profiles,
etc.). The variability of habits within a similar carbon-based STS shaping individuals towards
energy-consuming behaviours is probably one reason why ‘many studies have shown that a
combination of strategies is generally more effective than applying one single strategy’ (Abrahamse
et al., 2005, p. 282).
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Recommendation 3: Target ‘lead users’ and pave the way for a transition towards a low-
carbon STS
If different people tend to display different habits (and different propensities to rely on habits)
and if the interplay with users is essential for a nascent technology to mature, it is then
straightforward to look for those individuals, called ‘lead users’, who are most likely to use new
technologies (i.e. those that have the habit of looking for novelty). The idea is thus to build on
the same interplay between individuals and socio-technical influences described in the previous
section in order to trigger a positive feedback process towards a low-carbon STS. As shown by
Buenstorf and Cordes (2008), social groups play an important role in introducing change, given
the general tendency to imitate prestigious individuals. For example, Hollywood stars have
contributed to the promotion of new behaviours in favour of small ‘green cars’, which has had a
huge impact on those ‘traditional’ automobile companies that were unable to adapt to the new
consumption patterns. However, although the importance of social learning may temporarily
overcome the strong ‘hedonistic’ bias that favours unsustainable behaviours, the permanent
trade-off between these two contradicting forces suggests that recently induced ‘green behaviours’
can perhaps not be sustained in the face of new knowledge (Buenstorf and Cordes, 2008). The
interplay between habits and socio-technical accounts is thus essential to grasp, because of the
risk of seeing climate-friendly behaviours newly adopted by individuals being quickly ‘crowded
out’ by wider forces.
Nonetheless, policy-makers should seriously take into account the role of those groups which
create favourable conditions for the emergence of new niches and may prepare the ground for the
transition between different STS. In this context, policy-makers should create conditions that
favour the emergence of those ‘lead users’. Indeed, these highly intrinsically motivated individuals
may play a decisive role in technological development, as has been seen through the creation of
open source software (von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006). In addition, public authorities can also
play their part in modifying intrinsic and extrinsic motivation through the development of large
and visible public investments that may instil new values inside social groups. The example of the
city of Perpignan is illustrative of the importance of creating significant ‘small events’. By massively
investing in solar energy for the St Charles fruit and vegetable market, a highly visible and well-
known institution, municipal authorities have played a critical role in promoting ‘green’ technology
(Cros, 2008). This small decision was decisive, as it triggered an increased adoption by households
through generating a kind of ‘bandwagon effect’ for the diffusion of solar technology in the city.
5. Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that adopting an evolutionary perspective could provide decision-makers
with crucial complementary insights for dealing with energy- and climate-related issues. For
instance, the lock-in process makes it unlikely that traditional cost-efficient measures aimed at
internalizing external costs will be sufficient to bring about the required radical change in the
field of energy, because they fail to address structural barriers (del Rio and Unruh, 2007, p. 1511).
Furthermore, one consequence of the existence of habits (which are clearly at play in energy
consumption) is that pricing instruments alone will not be sufficient to trigger change at the
level of agents (van den Bergh et al., 2006). Micro-level interventions are thus needed as much as
macro-level ones since, due to the potential rebound effect arising from unchanged energy-
consuming habits, ‘an exogenous increase in energy efficiency may not lead to lower energy
consumption’ (Brännlund et al., 2007, p. 15).
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Accordingly, climate policies should instead create conditions enabling the use of the cumulative
and self-reinforcing character of economic change highlighted by evolutionary analyses (Mulder
et al., 1999) and take into account the current lock-in of our economies in a carbon-based STS.
Similarly to the idea that disturbing the contextual forces which contribute to maintaining
‘counterintentional habits’ seems an inevitable strategy for changing them (Maréchal, 2009),
destabilizing the currently prevailing carbon-based STS is a necessary first step in initiating the
transition towards a low-carbon economy.
Acknowledging this, and building on the insights from the evolutionary approach, policy-
makers should go beyond their traditional role of simply financing technology, and should support
both social and physical technologies. As confirmed in an analysis of the German electricity
sector, circularity and cumulative causation (i.e. the building blocks of the evolutionary framework)
are essential features in such transition processes (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, p. 272). In line
with the claim that we ‘should not confuse ‘optimal’ with ‘what survives” (Schot and Geels,
2007, p. 607), policies could thus aim at influencing the selection environment such that ‘only
the greenest technologies will survive’ (van den Bergh et al., 2006, p. 70).
Notes
1. We use the word ‘mainstream’ (‘modern’, ‘traditional’ or ‘orthodox’ could also be used) to avoid the problems
arising from the somewhat ambiguous use of the term ‘neoclassical’, as shown in Colander (2000). By mainstream
economics, we refer to the Walrasian model of welfare economics which can be defined as the theoretical synthesis of
the Marshallian approach with marginal production theory and the rigorous precision of mechanical mathematics.
2. The range of models used in the Special Issue of the Energy Journal on the costs of the Kyoto Protocol (Weyant,
1999) provides a clear example of the omnipresence of CGE models in economic analyses of the climate issue.
3. The concept of ‘bounded rationality’ refers to the cognitive boundaries that prevent people from seeing, seeking,
using and sharing relevant accessible and perceivable information when making decisions. Rationality is bounded,
since individuals face limits both in formulating and solving problems and in processing information.
4. Note that this theory is somewhat at odds with the abundant empirical evidence of behavioural inconsistencies
such as loss aversion or hyperbolic discounting. Beyond these inconsistencies, Quiggin (2008, p. 199) also adds
that markets ‘do not work in the smooth and frictionless’ way assumed in standard models.
5. One example of misplaced concreteness is the battle over the figures contained in the Stern Review – notably
regarding the appropriate discount rate to be used – which has given rise to extensive debate in the literature (see,
for instance, Tol and Yohe, 2006; Nordhaus, 2007; Barker, 2008). The focus could have been placed instead on the
meaning of the proposed measures and the costs of adaptation of socio-economic systems to a changing climate.
6. For a good overview of that debate, see IPCC (1996, chapters 8 and 9) and the Special Issue of Energy Policy
(Huntington et al. 1994).
7. Interestingly, Barker (2008, p. 175) notes that it may also be the case in the debate around the appropriateness of
cost-benefit analyses (CBA) in the field of climate change, judging by the responses of traditional economists to the
Stern Review.
8. See Sutherland (1991) and Howarth and Andersson (1993), who explain the ‘efficiency paradox’ through the
existence of hidden costs – mostly transaction costs.
9. See the limits of, for instance, market forces in de Almeida (1998); of energy labels in Gram-Hanssen et al. (2007);
and of price signals in Meier and Eide (2007).
10. Note that, as mentioned by Schleich and Gruber (2008), ‘the categorization of barriers is contested in the literature
in the sense that different authors use different typologies’. For instance, Kounetas and Tsekouras (2008, p. 2519)
present four distinct categories of factors explaining the efficiency paradox. One of these refers to non-economic
factors (e.g. environmental regulation, labels, etc.) but that are not of a psychological nature.
11. However, routines are not reducible to the mere sum of individual habits. As Hodgson (2007, p. 111) clearly puts
it ‘[r]outines are organizational meta-habits, existing on a substrate of habituated individuals in a social structure’.
12. Although it was not apprehended in the same manner as in this article, the important role of inertia in climate
policy has already been acknowledged by Grubb et al. (1995).
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13. It should be noted that a ‘system’ is a network of elements, whereas a ‘regime’ is a network of people. Socio-
technical regimes serve to maintain and stabilize socio-technical systems (see Geels and Kemp, 2007).
14. In line with the concept of ‘path-dependence’ which refers to the fact that technological systems follow specific
trajectories that it is difficult and costly to change (Arthur, 1983; David, 1985). As shown by Arthur (1989), these
trajectories depend on historical circumstances, timing and strategy as much as optimality (i.e. the main focus of
mainstream economics). As defined by Puffert (2002, p. 282), a path-dependent process is ‘one in which specific
contingent events – and not just fundamental determinative factors like technology preferences, factor endowments
and institutions – have a persistent effect on the subsequent course of allocation’.
15. Habits can be characterized as a context-dependent form of acquired automaticity. However, this automaticity is
somewhat limited (i.e. it is only a ‘predisposition’) by a required functionality or correspondence with objectives.
16. This high degree of constraint arise from the feelings of time pressure and information overload that characterize
today’s society, as explained by Lindbladh and Lyttkens (2002).
17. Even though the range of what people report to be a comfortable temperature is wide, indoor climate is converging
(Shove, 2004; Shove et al., 2008).
18. To put it differently, ‘habits are the constitutive material of institutions’, while the presence of institutions ensures
that ‘accordant habits are further developed and reinforced among the population’ (Hodgson, 2007, p. 107).
19. For instance, in the ‘Battle of the motors’, US engineers were able to switch from electric to gas-powered vehicles
because they ‘did not put all their eggs in one basket, nor were they irrevocably committed to any particular
technology’ (Foreman-Peck, 1996, p. 9).
20. A niche is a limited space where new technologies can mature. When there is a protection (whether public or not),
a niche is said to be technological. If not, it is called a market niche (Mulder et al., 1999, p. 11). For instance, the
Internet was developed within a technological niche, whereas railways grew within a market niche (Windrum and
Birchenhall, 2005, p. 125).
21. For example, as far as car fuel is concerned, agro-fuel is a form of hybridization, whereas the development of fuel
cells is a niche.
22. It has a score of 9.06 on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 anchored by ‘not at all interesting’ to ‘very interesting’. For
instance, ‘the feeling of acting individually to fight against a global issue’ has a score of 8.30, whereas the score of
‘individual follow-up’ is only 5.60. The complete results can be found in the June 2007 report on www.defi-
energie.be (in French).
23. For instance, as far as green products are concerned, when consumers actually purchase a car, they do not always
put in practice their intentions (Meyer et al., 2006; Englert et al., 2009).
24. The number of blood donors decreased after the introduction of a reward, as it appeared to conflict with the
values of voluntary donors (for a recent debate on the ‘crowding-out’ effect, see Mellström and Johannesson,
2008).
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